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Economics of anti-equilibrium
Adaptation
The intruders must conceal all markers, the defenders need to detect one marker.
Sampling
The defenders gather information actively.
Honeypot
The defenders sacrifice territory for information.
Fortification
The defenders defend all attack vectors, the attackers attack any attack vector.
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